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Abstract 
Machine learning (ML) is an increasingly popular approach/technique for analysing 
“Big Data” and predicting risk behaviours and psychological problems. However, few 
published critiques of ML as an approach currently exist. We discuss some 
fundamental cautions and concerns with ML that are relevant when attempting to 
predict all clinical and forensic risk behaviours (risk to self, risk to others, risk from 
others) and mental health problems. We hope to provoke a healthy scientific debate to 
ensure that ML’s potential is realized and to highlight issues and directions for future 
risk prediction, assessment, management, and prevention research. ML, by definition, 
does not require the model to be specified by the researcher. This is both its key 
strength and its key weakness. We argue that it is critical that the ML algorithm (the 
model/s) and the results are both presented and that ML needs to be become machine-
assisted learning like other statistical techniques; otherwise we run the risk of 
becoming slaves to our machines. Emerging evidence potentially challenges the 
superiority of ML over other approaches and we argue that ML’s complexity 
significantly limits its clinical utility. Based on the available evidence, we believe that 
researchers and clinicians should emphasize identifying, understanding, and 
explaining (formulating) individual clinical needs and risks and providing 
individualized management and treatment plans, rather than trying to predict, or 
putting too much trust in predictions that will inevitably be wrong some of the time 
(and we do not know when). 
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Public health significance statement 
Machine learning is a statistical approach/technique that is increasingly being used in 
an attempt to improve the accuracy with which risky behaviours and mental health 
problems are predicted. This study discusses some key considerations for using 
machine learning and making it even more useful. 
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Cautions, concerns, and future directions for using machine learning in relation to 
mental health problems and clinical and forensic risks: A brief comment on “Model 
complexity improves the prediction of nonsuicidal self-injury” (Fox et el., 2019) 
 
We read the machine learning (ML) study by Fox et al. (2019) with great 
interest. It has many strengths. A number of potentially important and interesting 
predictors were measured in a fairly large sample of high-risk individuals four times 
over one month, with high retention rates. Measurement over four time points may 
have increased power to detect effects in these traditionally low base rate behaviours 
(it would in a regression model). The development of an evidence-base regarding the 
short-term prediction of nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI), attempting suicide, and other 
types of risk is critical for clinical practice because clinicians are tasked with 
predicting current and imminent risk and clinical need and forecasting whether these 
things will change in the coming hours, days, and weeks.  
ML is a popular approach/technique for analysing “Big Data” (Jordan & 
Mitchell, 2015) and increasingly being touted (e.g., Franklin et al., 2017) as one of the 
key solutions to improving the prediction of mental health problems and risks to self 
(NSSI, suicide attempts). We welcome innovation and efforts to model the 
complexity of human cognition and behaviour in order to improve understanding, 
prediction, assessment, management, and prevention. However, we are aware of few 
published critiques of ML as applied to the prediction of risk behaviours or mental 
health problems. We did find an article cautioning that “when one repeatedly searches 
a large database with powerful algorithms, it is all too easy to “find" a phenomenon or 
pattern that looks impressive, even when there is nothing to discover” in an article in 
the journal Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery (Salzberg , 1999, p. 1). No 
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methodology or statistical technique is perfect; a healthy scepticism is the best way to 
ensure that new methods are used thoughtfully, to realize their potential, and to avoid 
making conclusions that go beyond the data.  
ML is a promising approach. It combines numerous variables to make very 
complex representations of data to improve prediction. This is potentially valuable 
because the available evidence indicates that clinical and forensic risks are extremely 
difficult to predict with sensitivity and specificity by clinicians or researchers (e.g., 
Fox et al., 2015; Franklin et al., 2017; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2009; Messing & 
Thaller, 2013); probably because risk thoughts and behaviour are complex, multiply 
determined, relatively acute, and, most importantly, have a low base rate. We heartily 
welcome sophisticated efforts to predict and/or explain when and why clinical risks 
become apparent or change (Siddaway, Wood, O'Carroll & O'Connor, 2019a). 
However, the study by Fox et al (2019) and ML as an approach have some important 
limitations that need to be borne in mind as this research base evolves. This Brief 
Comment highlights a number of fundamental cautions and concerns with ML that are 
relevant when attempting to predict any clinical and forensic risk or mental health 
problem. 
Limited generalisability. Although Fox et al (2019) report impressive 
predictive accuracy, their results are possibly not generalisable and may not be 
replicable as they were obtained using a very high-risk sample under very specific 
conditions (for a discussion of determinants of replication, see Siddaway, Wood, & 
Hedges, 2019b). Participants took part in an online survey, were each paid up to $70 
for participating, and retention rates were unusually high. 88% of participants had a 
history of NSSI, 62% had a history of attempting suicide, and rates of NSSI were 20%, 
35% and 41% at the three follow up time points. Predicting under these circumstances 
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(even in a crisis service) is very different to predicting in everyday clinical practice 
and at a population level.  
It is noteworthy that few to no published studies have tested the replicability 
of ML algorithms on independent datasets. Indeed, in a recent paper outlining future 
directions for the suicide attempt literature and for research on psychological 
problems in general, it has previously been argued that ML models struggle to 
replicate in new samples (Franklin, 2019). Replication is always important (Siddaway 
et al., 2019b); however, given the concerns outlined in this Brief Comment, ML is an 
area where replication seems fundamental.  
Methodological and reporting observations. The results presented by Fox et al. 
(2019) appear to validate the predictive validity of ML. ML substantially improved 
prediction beyond univariate and multivariate regressions. However, the authors did 
not, for example, test whether ML outperforms a latent variable multivariate 
regression model (which removes measurement error) or a multivariate regression 
model that included interactions and polynomials. More importantly, the clinical and 
research implications of the Fox et al. (2019) study (and other ML studies) are limited 
because the ML model/s that were used to obtain the results are not presented. It 
would be helpful to present the ML algorithm in detail, preferably in a way that is 
interpretable to clinicians. There are a number of considerations for studies of this 
kind. Were linear, nonlinear, and/or interaction effects modelled? How and for which 
individuals, using which variables? Were different models specified for different 
subpopulations? What were those models and what were the characteristics of the 
subpopulations?  
For results to be useful, clinicians need to understand how the science informs 
their practice. They mainly require if-then information. For example, if I incorporate 
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X, Y and Z variables into my clinical assessment, then I will be more likely to be able 
to accurately and reliably predict and explain my patient’s current and future risk to 
themselves. Or: For X subpopulation (e.g., males aged 20-30 with no history of NSSI), 
the risk of Y is Z. Transparency in ML model/s (i.e. how the model/s achieved the 
reported predictive accuracy) is necessary for establishing replication and would 
provide a “recipe” for which variables, in which combinations, for whom, when, 
provide accurate prediction. 
Machine learning, by definition, does not require the model to be specified by 
the researcher. This is both its key strength and its key weakness. ML departs from 
the usual convention in psychological science that involves painstakingly specifying 
and describing statistical model/s, usually based on a theory, and presenting results in 
detail – practices that become increasingly important as the complexity of the model/s 
increases. Because of this long-established best practice, there is a vast 
methodological literature investigating how and why to specify particular statistical 
models in particular ways, given particular sets of circumstances and assumptions, to 
achieve particular goals. For ML as an approach to have sustained and robust value 
for researchers, clinicians, and policy makers, the ML algorithm (the model/s) and the 
results both need to be presented (cf. risk of bias for prediction model studies; Wolff 
et al., 2019). ML needs to become machine-assisted learning like other statistical 
techniques; otherwise we run the risk of becoming slaves to our machines. 
Is the loss of interpretability worth it? Fox et al (2019) present impressive 
predictive accuracy – but at the cost of significantly increased and probably unusable 
complexity and compromised clinical utility. It is unclear whether ML’s complexity is 
useful or necessary. In most psychological studies, main effects explain most of the 
variance and interaction effects do not substantially improve prediction, meaning that 
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complexity only slightly improves prediction, while interpretability is lost. It is 
difficult to imagine how very, very complex representations of data can be readily 
understandable to humans (e.g., enumerable slopes and intercepts) or have relevance 
to everyday clinical practice. Again, ML’s attempt to model complexity is both its key 
strength and its key limitation. 
This is of course the challenge and trade-off that researchers face when 
attempting to develop convincing and powerful theoretical models because as models 
become more complex in order to increase explanatory power, their clinical utility 
reduces (see Dalgleish, 2004). Simpler models are more accessible and have greater 
clinical utility but offer reduced explanatory power. How this trade-off is resolved 
depends on the aims and needs of the person using the theory (Dalgleish, 2004). 
Multiple regression and structural equation modelling, for example, are more 
interpretable methods than ML because explained variance, effect sizes, and 
predictive accuracy metrics can potentially be computed and reported.   
Emerging evidence in the suicide research field, for example, brings into 
question the superiority of ML over other approaches. A recent review reported that 
positive predictive values (PPVs) are mostly “extremely low,” leading the authors to 
conclude that ML currently offers limited clinical utility (Belsher et al., 2019). By 
contrast, Fox et al. (2019) were able to achieve strong predictive accuracy, which was 
probably attributable to the specific characteristics of their sample and research design. 
Their results may not replicate in an independent sample. 
We are also aware of a forthcoming study that compared five different ML 
techniques to predict suicide ideation and attempts over one year using twenty 
different psychological constructs and found that unregulated multivariate logistic 
regression performed as well as ML (Van Mens et al., in press). Clearly, further 
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research is needed to clarify whether and under what conditions ML does or does not 
outperform other statistical approaches. 
Limited clinical utility? It remains to be seen whether the potentially improved 
predictive accuracy that ML may offer actually improves clinical outcomes. ML could 
arguably usefully inform clinical practice even if the models are not described or 
comprehensible. Randomised controlled trials are required to test this question. We 
are aware of one fascinating effort in this regard (Jaroszewski, Morris & Nock, 2019); 
more are required, particularly regarding everyday clinical practice. Incorporating ML 
into everyday practice might make no difference or could even make things worse if it 
was somehow used as a substitute for a thorough, collaborative, theory and research-
informed assessment and individualised risk formulation which describes, explains, 
and predicts risk and informs an individualised management plan.  
Completely accurate and reliable prediction of mental health phenomena that 
have low base rates is probably impossible, so it is possible that ML is trying to 
achieve an impossible goal. A combination of relatively weak relationships between 
risk factors and risk behaviours such as NSSI (Fox et al., 2015) or suicide attempts 
(Franklin et al., 2017), combined with the low base rate of clinical and forensic risks, 
places a ceiling on PPVs and inevitably leads to false positives and false negatives. 
Fox et al. (2019) present a PPV of 94% at three days. Even with this high-risk sample 
and extraordinary predictive accuracy, the ML model presented by Fox et al (2019) 
still missed people at each time point (46 people at three days, 55 people at 14 days, 
and 53 people at 28 days). 
It is worth remembering that predictive performance metrics (e.g., positive/ 
negative predictive values, area under the receiver operating characteristic curve 
[AUC], sensitivity, specificity) are dependent on the population and methodological 
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robustness of the study; transferring results to different settings may therefore be 
challenging as predictive values are affected by prevalence (Quinlivan et al., 2016). 
Evaluating performance metrics also depends on how the tools will be used in clinical 
practice (Quinlivan et al., 2016). For example, AUC, a measure of global predictive 
accuracy, is useful for comparisons and meta-analyses but less appropriate for clinical 
practice due to the lack of information on sensitivity (the proportion of people who 
repeat a risk behaviour and who are identified by a scale as being “high risk”) and 
specificity (the proportion of people who do not repeat a risk behaviour and who are 
identified by a scale as being “low risk”). Sensitivity and specificity provide 
information about the performance of a particular scale compared to a reference 
standard (outcome or gold standard) but not the actual probability of the event 
occurring in practice. PPVs report the probability that a person identified as “high 
risk” actually goes on to repeat a risk behaviour, which may be more useful for 
clinicians.  
It goes without saying that there are serious, potentially adverse consequences 
associated with over or under-estimating (predicting) clinical and forensic risks. 
“High”/“low” risk predictions in research and clinical practice are often wrong. For 
example, almost half of all the people who die by suicide come from the “low” risk 
strata (Large et al., 2017). The potential downside of risk stratification in clinical 
practice is that some people are incorrectly classified as being “high-risk” (false 
positives) and directed to unnecessary treatment whilst many others are classified as 
“low-risk” (false negatives) and denied much needed treatment (Large et al., 2017). 
Conclusion. Researchers and clinicians have long wrestled with the daunting 
challenge of accurately and reliably predicting and managing different clinical and 
forensic risks and a very broad range of risk assessment tools, methodologies, and 
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statistical techniques have been developed to aid this endeavour. ML is an 
increasingly popular approach/technique that seems to have great potential. However, 
it is not a panacea – nothing is. Like all statistical techniques, it should be viewed as 
one potential tool that may be thoughtfully drawn upon and implemented to answer 
particular research questions and perhaps aid clinical practice. The parameters of 
ML’s effectiveness (how, when, and why it might aid clinical practice) are empirical 
questions.  
It is noteworthy that different types of clinical and forensic risk (risk to self, 
risk to others, risk from others) continue to be studied in isolation, with largely 
separate literatures. Our view is that many causal mechanisms and useful clinical 
principles and techniques may be applicable to the assessment, formulation, and 
management of all types of risk and that is therefore much to be gained by integrating 
different risk literatures.  
Based on the available evidence across different literatures, our view is that 
researchers and clinicians who work with all types of clinical and forensic risk should 
emphasise identifying, understanding, and explaining (formulating) individual clinical 
needs and risks and providing individualised management and treatment plans, rather 
than putting too much trust in predictions that will inevitably be wrong some of the 
time (and we do not know when). This is because different clinical and forensic risks 
are complex, multiply determined, relatively acute, and, most importantly, have a low 
base rate. These tasks will be best achieved through a considered and individualised 
combination of (1) psychological theory, (2) empirical evidence regarding static and 
dynamic causal risk factors (perhaps the output of ML research), and (3) experienced 
professional judgment and decision-making (opinion). A combination of (2) and (3) 
are often referred to as ‘structured professional judgment’ or ‘structured clinical 
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judgement’ in the forensic literature. Risk factors need to be combined for each 
individual person through formulation and clinical judgement, rather than in a 
predetermined or simplistic fashion such as creating a total score on a scale. This 
approach has obvious, close parallels with the individualised assessment, formulation, 
and interventions that are advocated in psychological therapy.  
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